Are Jomini's principles universally valid in warfare regardless of technology or environment? Why or why not?
In a bid to create cohesive military doctrine within the unconventional warfare area, it is imperative to take into account the principles of war (POW) context that have acted as the military thought pillar for many years; however, as other theoretical frameworks, it has been a subject of significant speculation and discussion concerning its universal use in war. The relevance and utility characterizing the POW have constituted the focal point of military discussion since their formulation. This essay seeks to answer the question pertaining to whether Jomini's principles are universally valid in warfare regardless of technology or environment by focusing on four major principles of mass, objective, offensive, and maneuver.
On one side of the discussion, there is the argument that POW constitutes scientific principles that must be followed to the letter. On the other hand, there is the argument that POW offers merely a guide, construct, framework that necessitates their selective use as different scenarios may require. While majority have recognized their significance within traditional wars, their utilities within unconventional conflicts are still contested, and thus resulting in extensive debate. There are people who cling to the view that unconventional warfare should have their guiding principles.
With regard to mass, the issue in attempting to use it on unconventional wars is that terrorists avoid major battle, thus it is nearly impossible to utilize the principle. The massing of superior firepower and troops on the unconventional battlefields is ineffective and a waste of resources and puts one at a risk of hit -and-run and ambush tactics perpetuated by small terror cells who have higher mobility and maneuverability. The principle of mass has been used within contemporary conflicts and has a place within the military transformation. As transformation takes place, it is imperative that the ideas behind the principles are comprehended and means modified to replicate technological advancements.
Notably applying offensive action to mass forces against weaker enemies is not effective in unconventional wars. Admittedly, Jomini felt that conventional POW were not applicable to unconventional conflict. In his works on strategy, Jomini consented to one significant exception to the principle of massed, offensive action. The exception pertained to opinion wars, national, religious, or civil wars. He stated that soldiers preferred warfare "loyale et chevaleresque" at the expense of "organized assassination" of ideological, national and civil wars.
Regarding maneuver as a POW, it can be inferred that guerilla/terrorist units are foot mobile and excessively light organizations; they have the capacity of maneuvering through different terrains unimpeded. In view of this, they have a unique edge over traditional forces. Because they select difficult and rugged terrain wherein to operate and train affords them a huge familiarity and increases their edge over traditional forces. The first example called the great left hook was used by General Schwarzkopf for maneuver during the war to drive out Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Additionally, in Afghanistan the Special Forces were utilized to maneuver within the operation area to serve as sensors. They identified targets and utilized air assets to eliminate them.
The principle of objective is not solely applicable but perhaps more pertinent within counterinsurgency/terrorist operations. According to Clausewitz, no individual starts war without knowing the intentions of the war as well as how it is conducted (p, 579). Objectives could be marred by frustrations or require to be reviewed on the basis of intelligence information. Revolutionary movements linked to drug trafficking are especially complex as two wars are being fought concurrently, that is the drug war and the revolution, thus different objectives might exist for each. A perfect scenario illustrating a flawed objective and its implications is the Vietnam War.
An opposing perspective is offered by Starry who infers that while any list of POW that a nation adopts has application in the whole warfare spectrum, it should be inferred that there is an interrelation and interdependent. No single principle could be observed or adhered to blindly to the expense of others.
Given the existing increment of technological settings, the principles pertaining to maneuver, mass, offense, and objective remain universally valid. In contrast, the principles embraced by Jomini can be considered universal, ignoring the technological increment as well as setting because they define actions regarding combat power operations. However, military organizations have designed their technologically -oriented tenets to attain their goals. Although countries such as Britain embraced Jomini's steps during the First World War, the United States embarked on initiating their tenets with the aforementioned elements after the war ended. If the issue is perceived from that perspective, the principles of Jomini are not used universally;however, they constitute important steps towards identification of action within different military operations.
Jomini's principles might be considered universally valid irrespective of environment or technology. As Huber asserted, Jomini's principles are important in the sense that they help analyze combat operations despite the changes in environment and technology over the years. The principles of Jomini do not necessitate a technological upgrade to be considered operationally appropriate. Although Jomini's principles are merely utilised as guides and not implemented fully in all situations, they constitute important steps when planning military operations. According to an analysis undertaken by Mallick, given the dynamic shift in the environment, the principles of Jomini constitute important ingredients, which provide a better knowledge of the warfare science and art.
Ettrich's analysis revealed that for nearly two centuries, military organizations had employed Jomini's war concepts and principles despite the shifting environment of war. In most cases, the US had applied Jomini's conceptual plan in spite of operational environment changes. The implementation of Jomini's principles is exemplified in wars including the Cold war, the Second World War, and Civil Wars. In 1921, the United States formally integrated Jomini's principles into its military following publication of the nine war principles.
The concept that characterized Jomini's principles was regarded as an unchangeable tenet and utilised for guiding organizational objectives, doctrine, strategy, tactics. Jomini's principles have been able to survive for many years due to their unique capacity of energizing the thinking process of military planners and commanders.
Jomini's principles might be considered not universally valid within warfare to a few people despite the important role they play in guiding functional features of war. The establishment of the principles was intended at assisting in military operation implementation for traditional warfare that was characterized by large armies, which used cavalry, artillery, and infantry within strategic formations. The constant change within the warfare setting coupled with newly employed technology and complex wars, has increased the incompatibility of the principles. The 21st Century has witnessed changes in war across the globe because of the emergence of unconventional wars. The principles that Jomini established are unnecessary when perceived from the perspective of the adversary's technology, innovation, and complexity. There are critics who argue the principle is outdated and confusing. A critic of offensive principle posits that when a force is on the offensive, it is not guaranteed it will achieve the initiative, thus it might forego the initiative.These constitute plausible arguments; however, they have been applied with a misconception of the principle.
The four principles have complimented military organizations in obtaining knowledge from wars. Jomini's POW do not appear to cater for modifications demanded by future settings. Some important elements of future milieu would feature proliferation of WMD alongside long-range ballistic missiles, rise in terrorism, more developments in IT, emergence of regional hegemons, and reducing defense budgets. As a result of, there will be significant dependence on collective security mechanisms, via alliances and coalitions, such as KORUS, NATO etc. Jomini 's principles cannot be applied to minimally intense wars and nuclear wars; this explains why applying them universally is unachievable. The existing war setting does not necessitate harsh battle; however, it requires sound response, forbearance, restraint, and durability. The existing warfare setting does not need ruthlessness but instead it needs subtle response, patience, self-control, and firmness.
From a conventional perspective, the existing POW is still universally applicable to conventional battles and operations despite the shifting operating and technology environment. For instance, the principle pertaining to 'mass', whether from the impacts or forces is ideal to traditional operations. Nevertheless, the technological upgrades coupled with unconventional wars have increasingly reduced their applicability to present and upcoming operations. Terrorist groups technological abilities, innovation, and nuclear threats constitute a rare problem. Countries are left without choice but to set up wartime principles, which can help overcome the ability of adversaries and come up with means of getting ahead, counterattacking, and overcoming more challenges. Moreover, many countries apply and interpret POW differently, thus making it difficult to determine the universal validity of the four principles (maneuver, mass, offense, and objective) during the 21st-century operational war setting.
Conclusion
As countries transform with technologies, so must the mode of thinking of military leaders change. The emerging technology should be exploited and embraced by ensuring that the applications align with the concepts of the POW. This does not imply that all concepts are used to achieve success, or it is guaranteed that the applications will often generate success. They offer a starting point for planners and leaders, and must comprehend the risks linked to the incapacity of working in the concepts.
In conclusion, it can be inferred that the principles are not immutable. When one takes into account the extent of their significance, to be utilized in a conflict, which features the lives of many soldiers, one easily identifies the necessity of the POW to be debated and reviewed regularly. As illustrated in this essay, the four POW (mass, maneuver, offensive, and objective) do not need major changes as the military undergoes transformation to increase the application of new technology. In view of this, the perception surrounding the principles of war, in particular, mass, maneuver, offensive, and objective should change to comprehend how modern technology can enhance them.